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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff s business was previously licensed by the City as a Home Occupation, 
pursuant to local ordinance. The ordinance requires a person running such a business 
to reside in the home. The City Council found, after a hearing, that Plaintiff did not 
live in the home, as she spends a significant minority of her time at a second home 
Arizona, Plaintiff maintains that she aoes reside in the home, and that the question 
of residence is a question of law to be determined by State law, or by a standard 
deemed appropriate by this Court. Under such a standard, her residency, and her right 
to retain her business license should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT TCTMARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE." 
Appellee argues that "appellant has failed to marshall {sic} the evidence and as 
a result her Appealo {sic} should be dismissed."(Aplee. Br.l). Appellee has misstated 
the standard, as Defendant was granted Summary Judgment in the court below. 
According to rule 56 U.R.C.P., summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." On appeal of a summary judgment case, the Supreme 
Court, in Winegar v. Froerer Corp.,813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991), said: "In 
reviewing the trial court's ruling, we accept the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the losing party. Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
2 
law, we may reconsider the trial court's legal conclusions", Thus, in cases of 
summary judgment there is no duty of the appellant to "marshal the evidence". Such 
a duty would arise only when a factual determination has been made by the trial court, 
based on contested evidence, The Supreme Court set out the requirement of 
marshaling the evidence in Matter of Estate of Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 
1994): 
The District Court's factual findings, however, are fatal to La Jauna's 
argument. The court specifically found that La Jauna knew and 
understood the contents of the agreement and that she agreed to be 
bound by its terms. According to the Court, she signed the agreement 
"voluntarily"and "of her own free will." Again, to successfully 
challenge factual findings such as these, an appellant must first marshal 
all of the evidence that supports the findings and then demonstrate that 
even viewing it in the light most favorable to the district court, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the finding. 
This case is not similar. Appellant, in her original brief, set out the findings of fact 
made by the West Point City Council, concerning whether Appellant "resided" in the 
home, and whether she was an "inhabitant thereof. Much of the testimony leading 
to those conclusions was obtained from Plaintiff herself. The contested portion of the 
material presented to the City Council was relatively minor. According to Ms. Price, 
the Business License Administrator, "I had a young couple come in and talk to me 
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and they were upset with Ms. Derian/' In discussing her conversation with them, 
she stated she was told "they had moved in and were living there in trade for running 
her business/9 (Tr.2). The City Council, in its findings of fact (No. 11), reviewed the 
testimony of Ms. Derian: "she acknowledged that Cassandra Adams lived in the home 
for a time, but denied that Cassandra ran the business."If, of course, Mr. & Mrs. 
Adams were living there and running the business, they would have complied with 
the ordinance which required the business to be ran by the "inhabitants". While this 
evidences a conflict in testimony, It is unlikely that the decision of either the City 
Council or the Court below hinged on it. It was more important to the City Council 
that Ms. Derian was absent from the home for four or five months a year (Finding of 
Fact No. 14). Therefore, in its Finding of Fact No. 15, the City Council stated: "Ms. 
Derian does not meet the Ordinance requirement that in order to carry on a Home 
Occupation the use shall be carried on by the 'inhabitants thereof and that the owner 
of the Home Occupation business must reside in the dwelling". (R.29-31). That last 
statement of course, is not a statement of fact at all, but is a conclusion of law. It is 
this conclusion that is being contested by Ms. Derian; and she does need to "marshal 
the evidence" in order to do so. The statement of facts presented by Defendant is 
less than a full page of its brief and fails to point out the factual areas were 
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marshaling is necessary. On page 5 of its brief Defendant states "what Appellants 
cannot do is merely re-argue the factual case they presented in the trial court." 
Actually, Appellant can do just that in a summary judgment case. This being a legal 
conclusion/' an appellate court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
trial court." Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah App. 1987). 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE WEST POINT CITY COUNCIL AND THE TRIAL 
COURT WERE LEGAL DECISIONS INTERPRETING AN ORDINANCE. THE 
INTERPRETATION OF THAT ORDNANCE IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
DEFERENCE. 
In Point II of its Brief, the City cites § 10-9-1001 of the Utah Code which 
requires courts , in appeals of municipal land decisions, to " presume that land use 
decisions and regulations are valid". Apparently, the City suggests that Appellant 
disagrees with that general policy. Appellant does not claim that the general land 
use policies of the City of West Point are invalid. Instead, Appellant claims 
that a particular municipal licensing decision relies on an arbitrary and 
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capricious interpretation of the municipal ordnance, Where important terms are 
undefined in a municipal ordnance, it is the duty of the court to determine what 
definition "makes sense". As that is a legal determination , the interpretation of 
the City and the lower court are reviewed for correctness. See Petersen v. South 
Salt Lake, 1999 UT 93,987 P.2d 57 (Utah 1999) 
In fulfilling its legal duty, the Court does not in any way infringe on the 
municipality's land use decisions. While the City cites a number of appellate cases 
granting deference to municipal land decisions, it still misses the point. This case 
terms on whether the Appellant resides in the home, and whether she thus qualifies 
as an "inhabitant" in the context of running her business from that location. While 
the City is fervent in defending what it refers to as its land use decisions, it has 
not yet made any attempt to explain its refusal to renew Plaintiff's business licence 
in terms of that land use policy. It is less than obvious what harm will be 
done to the land use policies of the City if Plaintiff retains her business licence. 
Plaintiff suggests that reading into the ordinance a definition of residency which 
"makes sense" is in the best interest of all parties, including the City. 
The City goes on, in Point III of its brief to claim that there is "substantial 
evidence in the record to support the decision of West Point City". While that may 
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be the case, the decision of this Court is still a legal one in interpreting the ordinance. 
There is "substantial evidence" that Plaintiff does not reside in the home, nor does 
she"inhabit" it. full time; but the evidence is uncontested that she is there a majority 
of the time. With that in mind she cannot reside elsewhere. Consequently, the home 
in West Point is the only place she can reside. That being the case, it "makes sense" 
to rule that she is a resident of that home, and is entitled to keep her business license. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Court granting Summary Judgment to West Point City should 
be reversed, and Plaintiff should be granted Summary Judgment to the effect that her 
business license should be renewed. 
DATED this hP* day of April, 2005. 
W. ANDREWoMCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Appellant 
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